The paper reviews the state of the economic literature on the link between nancial development and growth. We rst examine the issue of measurement of nancial development and the debate on the direction of causality between nance and growth. Next, we extensively discuss the various channels through which the nancial sector can aect growth, including the increase in the eciency of capital allocation, the reduction in information costs, the improvement of risk management, and the support of innovation. The analysis is conducted referring both to the theoretical literature and to the most recent empirical ndings. We conclude by drawing lessons for the current debate on the reform of the nancial sector in the aftermath of the Great Recession.
Introduction
Does nancial development aect economic growth? This is probably one of the most challenging and fascinating research questions that macroeconomists and nancial economists have faced in the last fty years or so. A formalization of the idea that nance aects economic growth dates back to Schumpeter's discussion on the sources of development (Schumpeter, 1961) . Schumpeter argued that the services provided by nancial intermediaries are essential for technological innovation and economic development. Although several theoretical and empirical studies later supported this hypothesis, a consensus is far from being reached.
While some scholars endorse the Schumpeterian idea, others contend that nancial development simply follows economic growth or, at least, that the relationship between nancial and economic development has been "over-stressed" (Lucas, 1988) .
The last decade of the 20th century witnessed renewed interest for the topic. The emergence of the endogenous growth theories (Romer (1990) , Grossman and Helpman (1991) , and Aghion and Howitt (1992)) induced scholars to pose the question whether the development of the nancial sector can be an engine of growth. On the empirical side, the increasing availability of large cross-country data sets on income and nancial institutions paved the way for more rigorous tests on the nance-growth link (Tsuru, 2000) .
The debate on the topic has become even more intense in the late 1990s and at the beginning of the new century. The nancial turbulences that hit rst South East Asia in the late 90s and more recently the United States have stimulated interest towards the impact of nancial development on crises and macroeconomic volatility. The literature has then started to acknowledge the possibility that nancial development fosters long-run economic growth at the cost of generating higher volatility in the short run, for example by amplifying the impact of small aggregate shocks.
Financial development is dened by the World Economic Forum (2012) as the policies, factors, and institutions that lead to ecient intermediation and eective nancial markets. In a neoclassical ArrowDebreu model, in which information is perfect, risk is fully and eciently internalized in the price system, suppliers of funds deal directly with users of funds in the nancial market, and, in turn, the nancial market always adjusts to the equilibrium level of the interest rate that equalises supply and demand for funds.
Economies are however plagued by frictions. For instance, the problems of asymmetric information present in nancial transactions lead to the well-known market failures of adverse selection and moral hazard. The nancial system can ameliorate such problems. More in general, Levine (2005) points out ve broad functions that nancial intermediaries and nancial markets play and that could be relevant for economic growth: (i) production of ex-ante information about investment opportunities; (ii) ex-post monitoring of investments; (iii) trading, diversication, and management of risk; (iv) mobilization and pooling of savings, and (v) exchange of goods and services. By performing these functions, the nancial sector can promote the formation of (physical and human) capital, increase the degree of eciency in the allocation of capital, minimize the cost of information acquisition, improve the management of risk, and promote innovation.
This review of the the literature on the link between nancial development and growth is organised as follows. Section 1 lays the grounds for the analysis, by dening nancial development and discussing how it can be measured. Section 2 addresses the debate on the direction of causality between nancial development and growth. Section 3 examines the specic channels through which nancial development can aect growth.
Section 4 outlines directions for future research and concludes.
Dening and measuring nancial development
If the late 80s and early 90s saw the development of several theoretical studies aimed at analyzing the link between nancial development and economic growth, in the last two decades a large number of econometric studies have tried to empirically evaluate the impact of nancial variables on growth. Performing these econometric analyses has required to advance in the construction of quantitative measures of nancial development. The measurement of the performance and activities of nancial institutions and markets relies on several indicators, such as the depth, size, accessibility, and soundness of the nancial system. There is however little consensus on the choice of the most eective quantitative measures. Indeed, an issue that generates contradictory results in the empirical literature is the lack of a single indicator that captures adequately the various aspects of nancial development.
Quantitative measures of nancial development King and Levine (1993) employ several measures to capture the size of nancial intermediaries: the proportion of liquid liabilities to the GDP, the ratio of credit to private enterprises to the GDP, and the ratio of assets of commercial banks to the sum of commercial banks' assets and assets of central banks. Demetriades and Hussein (1996) simply consider the ratio of bank deposit liabilities to the GDP. Huang (2005) uses dierent indices depending on the object of measurement. To capture the depth of nancial intermediation, he includes the amount of liquid liabilities, banks' overhead costs and net interest margins. To assess stock market development, instead, he puts forth three main variables: stock market capitalization, total value traded, and turnover ratio. Saci and Holden (2008) measure the importance of the banking sector by considering, in addition to the previous indicators, the ratio of commercial bank assets to commercial plus central bank assets, the ratio of credit issued to the private sector to liquid liabilities, and the ratio of domestic credit to the private sector to the GDP. To capture stock market development they add the number of listed companies to the previous indicators. Finally, Antzoulatos and Thanopoulos(2008) construct a more structured index of nancial development, computed as a weighted index of banks', nancial institutions', stock market, and bond market development. The proxies for banking sector development include bank deposits over the GDP, banks' overhead costs, banks' concentration, banks' net interest margins. The proxies for the development of nonbank nancial institutions include life and non-life insurance premia. The development of the stock market is evaluated through the ratios of stock market capitalization to the GDP, stock market total value traded to the GDP, and the turnover ratio of the stock market. Finally, the proxies for bond market development include the ratios of private bond market capitalization to the GDP and public bond market capitalization to the GDP. From the above review, it emerges that the most used measure of the overall size of the nancial system is the value of some type of nancial assets generally expressed as a ratio of the GDP (see Figure 1 ). Source: Allianz, 2012 Many nancial systems of advanced economies feature not only a strong presence of banking institutions, but also of other institutional actors such as pension funds, insurance companies, hedge funds, and mutual funds. Therefore, despite the aggregate size of the nancial sector certainly provides useful information, it should be integrated with specic information about the relative importance of sub-sectors. In the Handbook on Financial Sector Assessment, the International Monetary Fund (2005) stresses that a correct assessment of the development of the nancial structure should cover all the dierent players engaging in nancial intermediation: commercial and merchant banks, savings institutions, development nance institutions, insurance companies, mortgage entities, and pension funds. Moreover, in order to take into account the dierent activities they perform, money, foreign exchange, and capital markets (including bonds, equities, and derivative and structured nance products) should also be covered in the assessment (see Table 1 ). Pitfalls of the quantitative measures
The measures described above might not accurately capture nancial development. For instance, the growth of the credit-to-GDP ratio may reect a nancial bubble and not the nancing of sound investment projects.
The severity of the recent nancial crisis has allegedly been due to the fact that in many countries banks had expanded their balance sheets (i.e., increased their credit) without a corresponding increase in the level and quality of capitalization. While, on the one hand, the expansion of credit may enable rapid economic growth by allocating capital to growth prospects, on the other hand excessive leverage may amplify the volatility of returns inducing greater probability of default.
A review of the literature on the relationship between excess of leverage, asset bubbles and economic growth is beyond the scope of this paper. Nevertheless it is worth citing two contributions that show that a mere expansion of the nancial sector is not necessarily positive for economic development. Geanakoplos (2010) elaborates a theory in which the possibility of default creates the need for collateral. This in turn entails variations in leverage that aect the price of assets, contributing to bubbles and busts. According to his view, when leverage (dened as the ratio of collateral values to the required downpayment) grows rapidly in boom times, asset prices tend to increase. In this leverage cycle, when the bubbles burst bad news cause the asset price to crash much further than it would if leverage was not excessive, and the crash takes place even if there is no subsequent crash in the fundamentals.
A second paper that shows that more intense nancial activity (more precisely, higher liquidity in the nancial market) could be harmful to economic growth is Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) . They show that market liquidity (i.e., the ease with which trades occur) and traders' funding liquidity (i.e., the ease with which they can obtain funding) are mutually reinforcing, leading to liquidity spirals . While market liquidity (i.e. the volume and value of daily nancial transactions) is often seen as positive per se, the authors show that, since it is correlated with volatility, loss spirals could arise if speculators hold a large initial position that is negatively correlated with customers' demand shock. In this scenario, if investors become unable to face funding market illiquidity, they are forced to engage in re sales, causing a further asset price drop, and so forth. Therefore the apparent expansion of nancial markets leads to a more fragile economic environment and to more severe eects of nancial crises 1 .
In a dierent vein, Petersen and Rajan (1995) suggest that another mere quantitative index of nancial development, the number of banks, is not necessarily a synonymous of a more ecient nancial sector. When the credit market is concentrated, creditors are more likely to nance credit constrained rms, because it is easier for them to internalize the benets of assisting rms. The ability of creditors to nance rms along the lifespan of their activity allows them to smooth interest rates over the life cycle of the rms, charging a lower-than-competitive rate when a rm is young and a higher-than-competitive rate when the rm ages.
A larger number of credit market actors could impose constraints on the ability of rms and creditors to intertemporally share surplus, making rms worse o as they cannot obtain cheap funds when mostly needed, that is, in the initial phase of their life cycle.
1 Banking sectors can also act as a mechanism of amplication of negative shocks (see, e.g., Guerrieri, Iacoviello and Minetti (2012) ).
More comprehensive measures of nancial development
A more comprehensive measure of the nancial development of a country is perhaps represented by the The rst three pillars capture the ability of the policy maker to lay the foundations for the development of nancial activities: i) the institutional environment; ii) the business environment; and iii) the degree of nancial stability. The second group of factors, instead, assess the eective development of the various players of the nancial sector: i) banking nancial services; ii) non-banking nancial services (e.g., investment banks and insurance rms); and iii) nancial markets. The third category comprises measures of access to capital and nancial services. 2 Financial development and growth: the direction of causality
Having dened nancial development, the next step of our analysis consists of examining its link with economic growth, meant as GDP growth or the per capita GDP. Figure 3 plots the Financial Development Index and GDP per capita for 63 countries. The gure displays a positive relationship between the index of nancial development and the per capita GDP, thus supporting the view that nancial sector development goes along with economic development. King and Levine (1993) show that the positive correlation between the two variables is robust to using various measures of nancial development. However, such a correlation does not oer insights into the direction of causality. Is nancial development that stimulates economic growth, or does nancial development respond to the demand for nancial services of a growing real sector? The macroeconomic approach
Analysing the possible direction of causality, Patrick (1966) puts forward a supply-leading hypothesis and a demand-leading hypothesis . According to the rst, a more developed nancial infrastructure promotes growth because it supplies new and more ecient nancial services. This idea was rst proposed by Schumpeter (1961) and then rened theoretically and supported empirically by McKinnon (1973) , King and Levine (1993) , Neusser and Krugler (1998) , and Levine and Zervos (1998) . Applying a GGM technique to a panel of 71 countries for the period 1960-1995, Levine et al. (2000) nd a link that goes from a higher level of banking sector development to GDP growth and total factor productivity growth. Xu (2000) nds support for the idea that nancial development promotes growth: through a VAR approach, he unveils a positive long-term relationship between the development of the nancial sector and increases in investment and GDP at least in 27 of the 41 economies examined over the period . More recently, Christopoulos and Tsionas (2004) combine cross-sectional and time series data and nd a one-directional (from nance to growth) positive relationship for 10 developing countries. Using a modied OLS technique to estimate the cointegrating relation, they demonstrate that there is no short-run causality between nancial deepening and output, while there is a structural positive eect in the long run. According to the demand-leading hypothesis, instead, the increasing demand for nancial services that stems from a growing real sector induces the nancial sector to expand. Based on this hypothesis, therefore, the lack of a developed nancial sector in less developed countries is not a constraint to their economic growth, but merely a manifestation of the lack of demand for nancial services by the real sector. Robinson (1979) initially supported this hypothesis, lately followed by the works of Gurley and Shaw (1960) , Goldsmith (1969) and Jung (1986) . Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) develop a model where nancial intermediation promotes growth by increasing the returns to capital and, at the same time, a more developed economy allows the nancial sector to oer more costly nancial services.
Their model would thus suggest that the chicken-egg dilemma cannot be solved, as growth and nancial structure are intrinsically linked and mutually reinforce each other. Goldsmith (1969) concludes that there is no possibility of establishing with condence the direction of the causal mechanism .
Nevertheless, many macroeconometric techniques have been used to to disentangle the direction of causality. Calderòn and Liu (2003) apply the so-called Geweke decomposition test: they decompose the link between nancial development and growth, considering the two possible causality directions (growth to nance and nance to growth) and the instantaneous causality between the two. They nd that in 109 developing and industrialized countries in the 1960-1994 period nancial development leads to economic growth, thus supporting the supply-leading hypothesis. However, splitting the sample between developed and developing countries, they also nd bi-directional causality, concluding that especially in developed economies real sector growth could signicantly inuence the development of the nancial sector. Patrick (1966) suggests that the direction of causality is indeed dierent in developed and in developing countries (stage-of-development hypothesis)
2 . During the initial stage of economic development, the nancial sector would stimulate economic growth, mainly by favouring capital formation and higher savings (supplyleading hypothesis). As economic development proceeds, however, the nancial sector would have to feed the innovation of the real sector, through the development of new nancial services (demand-leading hypothesis).
In an attempt to verify this conjecture, Hassan et al. (2011) use a panel regression with cross-sectional and time series-proxy measures, and nd a positive relationship between domestic credit development and economic growth in low-and middle-income countries, and a negative one in high-income economies. This stage-of-development hypothesis has also been corroborated by the empirical works of Demetriades and Hussein (1996) and Shan et al. (2001) who, using time-series techniques, nd that the direction of causality can run either way, according to the stage of development. This conclusion, however, has recently been questioned by Rioja and Valev (2004) who examine a broad sample of 74 countries over the period and uncover evidence that nancial development exerts a strong positive eect on economic growth only once it has reached a certain threshold; the eect then fades away once economic development reaches very high levels. Using GMM dynamic panel techniques, they nd that a 10% increase in nancial development would lead to a 0.2 percent higher growth rate in high-income countries, without any statistically signicant eect in low-income ones.
Most of these empirical results appear sensitive to the sampling method (period, classication of countries) and to the econometric technique. Just to give examples of this sensitivity, using Granger causality tests, Hassan et al. (2011) nd that, in the short run, there is a two-way causality between nance and growth in all regions, except for the Sub-Saharan and East Asia & Pacic regions, where causality runs from growth to nance. Despite the fact that these two regions are the most underdeveloped in their sample (thus supporting the idea of a non-linear relationship between economic growth and nancial development), the result contrasts with the negative relationship found by De Gregorio and Guidotti (1995) for Latin America (where instead Hassan et al. nd a positive statistically signicant coecient).
The microeconomic approach
Macroeconometric studies encounter various problems including omitted variables, selection bias and multicollinearity. For instance, Drill (2003) shows that the inclusion of relevant outliers and of regional dummies (especially those for the Asian Tigers ) makes the coecients on nancial development estimated by Levine and Zervos (1998) almost insignicant. Due to such problems, more micro approaches have been developed 2 This hypothesis was later supported by the empirical analysis of Jung (1986) . looking for industry/rm level evidence of the direction of causality between nancial variables and growth.
One of the rst microeconometric approaches is the one used by Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1995) , who estimate the proportion of rms' growth that could have been supported only by internal resources and the portion that could be related to external nance, notably nancial markets. By using nancial rm-level data for a sample of thirty countries from 1980 to 1991, they investigate how several measures of stock market development (the ratio of market capitalization to GDP, the ratio of total value traded to GDP, and the ratio of total value of shares traded to market capitalization) interact with rms' performance and nancing decisions. Their ndings support the nance-to-growth hypothesis, but they also underscore that the development of the stock market initially benets only the largest rms.
The cornerstone of this micro-based empirical literature is probably the work of Rajan and Zingales (1998) .
The authors stress that nancial development and growth could be driven by common omitted variables, such as the propensity of households to save. To overcome this issue, they look at U.S. sector specic data: using nancial statement data, they construct a proxy for each industry's need for external nance, dened as the dierence between investments and cash ow generated from operations. Under the assumption that capital markets in the United States are relatively frictionless (i.e., U.S. listed rms' access to nancial markets is not subject to frictions) they construct the technological demand for external nancing of each industrial sector. Next, they use cross-country industry data (41 countries and 36 sectors) to test whether sectors that rely more on external nance tend to grow faster, given the level of nancial development of the country. A key assumption behind this estimation methodology is that technology (and, hence, the demand for funding) could vary across industries but not across countries. By this procedure, they demonstrate that the causality goes from nance to economic growth, as the ex-ante development of nancial markets facilitates the ex post growth of sectors dependent on external nance. Based on the assumption that investments in new establishments are more likely to be carried out by new rms (which depend more on external nance than established ones), the authors show that nancial development has almost twice the eect on the growth of the number of establishments as it has on the growth of the average size of establishments. These results carry through after controlling for country and industry xed eects. Guiso et al. (2005) use a similar approach to quantify the eect of nancial development in the European Union, obtaining supportive evidence for the nance-to-growth hypothesis. Using a panel of rm-level data for companies in EU and transition countries for the period 1996-2001, they broaden the Rajan and Zingales' approach using also rm-level data in order to check the robustness of the results. Although the magnitude of the estimated eect reects dierent country and sector specicities, they nd that nancial development has a direct positive eect on countries' and sectors' growth. The extension to rm-level data allows to obtain additional insights into the structure of the link between nancial development and real variables.
Their estimates highlight, for instance, that the growth of small enterprises is more sensitive to nancial development than that of large rms. Finally, a similar approach is followed also by the work of de Serres et al. (2006) in which the authors interact industry-specic measures of external nancial dependence with a country-specic indicator of nancial development. Following Rajan and Zingales' approach, they nd that more developed nancial systems increased rms' value-added growth and labour productivity growth in OECD economies in the nineties.
A dierent branch of microeconometric literature focuses on disentangling the nance-to-growth nexus not by looking at rms' reliance on external funds, but on the ability of rms to better capture growth opportunities thanks to the access to extra funding for investments. Put dierently, this branch of literature underlines that the nance-to-growth channel is based on faster capital reallocation to industries with good growth opportunities. This is the case, for instance, of Fisman and Love (2004) who show that nancially A nal way of modelling the nance-growth link at the micro level is investigating how nancial development impacts on rm entry and survival. Considering the rst aspect (rm entry), Berger, Hasan and Klapper (2004) use a large data set which includes nancial data on over 3 million rms in 20 countries located in Western and Eastern Europe, and nd a strong dierential eect of nancial development on entry in external-nance-dependent sectors. Using private credit to GDP or stock market development as measures of nancial development, their analysis suggests that entry is higher in more nancially intensive industries (i.e. those that do more R&D) in countries that feature higher nancial development. These ndings are also supported by those of Beck et al. (2008) who, employing a cross-country cross-industry approach, show that 3 Bekaert et al. (2007) seem to partially contradict the previous two papers. Using a dierent measure of growth opportunities (constructed by combining the country's pattern of industrial specialization with indicators of global industry growth opportunities) and an industry-level dataset containing 50 countries, they show that nancial market openness (e.g., the liberalization of equity markets) is a more important determinant of the ability to exploit growth opportunities than nancial development. nancial development exerts a disproportionately positive eect on small rms. To reach this conclusion, the authors rst construct an industry-level size variable that measures the industrial reliance on small rms; next, they explore the eect of nancial development on entry rates.
Turning to rms' survival rate, a recent work of Aghion, Fally and Scarpetta (2007) countries. Their analyses suggest that the legal and regulatory system play a critical role in inuencing the ability of the nancial system to provide high-quality nancial services. They classify countries according to their legal origins, identifying four main legal systems: English, French, German, and Scandinavian. These origins of the legal system are particularly relevant: they strongly inuence the legal and regulatory environment governing nancial sector transactions, therefore explaining cross-country dierences in nancial intermediary development.
Since legal origin is treated as an exogenous variable, it can be used as an instrumental variable in nance-growth regressions. This is the approach followed by Levine, Loayza and Beck (2000) who use this instrumental variable to extract the exogenous component of nancial intermediary development. Their ndings show that, using legal origin dummy variables as instrumental variables, legal and regulatory changes that strengthen creditor rights, contract enforcement, and accounting practices boost nancial intermediary development with positive repercussions on economic growth.
Similarly, Levine (1999) examines the relationship between the legal system and banking development, and demonstrates that using the legal environment to measure the exogenous component of banking development, this indicator is robustly associated with per capita growth, physical capital accumulation, and productivity growth. Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998) also investigate how dierences in legal and nancial systems aect rms' use of external nancing to fund growth. Using a sample of 30 developing and developed countries, they show that the proportion of rms that grow at rates exceeding this predicted rate in each country is associated with specic features of a country's legal and nancial systems. Their ndings not only reveal that well-developed legal systems result in better rms' growth performance, but also that nancial development may indirectly increase dependence on external nancing by reducing rms' prots.
3 Channels of interaction between nancial development and growth Figure 4 summarizes the various theoretical arguments for why there could be a positive link between nancial development and economic growth. The nancial system can promote growth by boosting the volume of savings and investments or by improving the eciency in the allocation of savings across investment plans.
The nancial sector can achieve such eects by: i) reducing the costs of information; ii) improving the management of risk; and iii) fostering innovation. This section provides a detailed review of both theoretical and empirical ndings, disentangling the key mechanisms through which nancial development can aect growth. The nancial system can boost the volume of savings (that in a closed economy equal investments) or improve the allocation of pooled savings across investment projects.
Easing the pooling of savings
The nancial system pools together the savings generated in the household sector. In the banking sector, this task is primarily performed by banks' local branches, that, being close to savers, are able to create stable relationships with savers based on trust and on the repeated provision of nancial services. Figure 5 show the number of commercial bank branches and automated teller machines (per 100,000 adults) in developed and developing economies. is also supported by Gurley and Shaw (1960) , who demonstrate that the nancial sector promotes savings and nally results into an increase in output growth. The process of transforming savings into investments can involve several diculties, such as transaction and information costs for pooling households' savings (Levine,2005) . If the nancial system helps mitigate these frictions, the pooling of resources becomes easier 4 .
A closer look at the overall eect of nancial sector development on the volume of savings reveals an ambiguous relationship. Hassan, Sanchez and Yu (2011) show empirically that a more developed domestic nancial sector in developing countries may signicantly contribute to an increase in savings. However, using a sample of OECD countries and developing economies in the 1970s and 1980s, Jappelli and Pagano (1994) demonstrate that borrowing constraints can positively aect savings. Their study, supported also by the empirical ndings of De Gregorio (1996) , relies on the idea that in the absence of developed nancial markets and institutions, while individuals are unable to borrow, they are induced to increase their precautionary savings in order to face unexpected consumption needs in the future. Therefore, to the extent that nancial development reduces borrowing constraints, saving ratios could be lowered 5 .
Easing the allocation of savings to productive investments
Besides aecting the volume of savings, the nancial system eases the allocation of pooled savings to profitable investment projects. Smith (1937) stresses that nancial arrangements lower transaction costs through an ecient management of resources, resulting in greater specialization and in faster technological improvement. Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) develop a model in which both economic development and nancial development are endogenous. They argue that better nancial institutions lower the cost of transferring savings to investment projects, increase yields, and speed up the growth process. Greenwood and Smith (1997) examine the role of banks and stock markets and conclude that these help entrepreneurs identify investment opportunities. Bencivenga, Smith and Starr (1996) show that, as the liquidity of nancial assets increases in a country, resources are better allocated from an intertemporal point of view: the transformation of short-term savings into long-term investments permits the nancing of projects with longer time cycles, which are more likely to generate sustained growth. This view is shared by Levine (1991) , who shows that nancial development raises the ratio of savings devoted to long-run investments and reduces the likelihood of premature liquidation of protable investment projects.
In Khan (2001) , the reduction in the cost of nancial contracts implies a rise in the return on debt, a decline in the spread between borrowing and lending rates, and ultimately a reduction in the premium commanded by producers with access to investment loans. This virtuous cycle leads to an increase in the eciency of nancial intermediaries, raising the return on investments. A similar argument is put forward by Trew (2008) , who develops a growth model where the microeconomic frictions stem from the diculty of entrepreneurs to access credit. He demonstrates that, while the eciency-growth link always exists, the nancial depth-growth link may not. Matching growth rates with loan deposit spreads and with measures of bank protability, he shows that the numerical implications of his model are broadly in line with data only for the eciency-growth channel.
5 Nevertheless, both De Gregorio (1996) and Bencivenga and Smith (1993) stress that, in the presence of credit constraints, agents will be unable to borrow in case of income drops. This will induce them to hold their savings in the form of highly liquid and low productive assets, which, in turn, could have negative eects on growth.
Empirical ndings De Gregorio and Guidotti (1995) nd empirically that the eciency eect is the main channel through which nancial development promotes growth: according to their estimates, a 10% increase in credit speeds up growth by 0.18% via eciency gains and 0.07% via higher investment levels. This result is also consistent with the empirical ndings of King and Levine (1993) . Their study estimates that if the nancial sector expands by 10%, income increases more rapidly by 0.34 percentage points. Their analysis also concludes that more than 70% of this eect is attributable to higher eciency induced by a more developed nancial sector.
Rajan and Zingales (1998) study a large sample of countries over the 1980s and observe that industrial sectors that are relatively more in need of external nance develop disproportionately faster in countries with more developed nancial markets. They argue that access to credit gives rms more opportunities to search for protable investment projects. This result is consistent with an earlier study of Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1995) who, using micro-data at the rm level, estimate that the growth rates of rms with access to the credit market would not be sustained only by internal resources. Moreover, analyzing panel data for 65 countries, 28 industries, and 33 years, Wurgler (2000) demonstrates that better nancial markets are associated with a better allocation of capital: relative to countries with small nancial markets, nancially developed countries boost investments in growing industries and cut them in declining ones. Therefore, the key advantage of nancially developed countries is not the higher investment rate, but the better allocation of resources to protable investment projects 6 . This point is reminiscent of Bagehot (1873) argument that one of the reasons for England's good economic performance was an ecient capital allocation.
Minimizing the cost of information
The nancial system can foster growth because it produces information on borrowers, helping overcome information asymmetries between lenders and borrowers.
Ex-ante production of information
To explore this argument, Boyd and Smith (1992) develop a model of adverse selection in which verication of output is costly. They show that nancial intermediaries emerge because they have a comparative advantage in information acquisition. By reducing credit rationing and interest rate dierentials, nancial intermediaries ultimately create the conditions for economic growth. This model captures the fact that there are relevant costs for evaluating projects that could induce suboptimal levels of investment. For instance, it is usually dicult for households to collect information on investment opportunities, and the quality of the information 6 Recently, increasing attention has also been devoted to the dynamic process through which credit is reallocated across rms (see, e.g., Herrera, Kolar and Minetti (2011) ). they obtain may not be good enough to nance projects. As a result, projects that are potentially highly protable could be left idle.
The function of nancial intermediaries as information producers is also well described in Boyd, Prescott and Smith (1988) . Boyd et al. argue that asymmetric information in investment contracts results into an adverse selection problem. In a situation in which information is poor, bad-type agents mimic good-type ones, by promising to engage in projects of similar quality and protability. In this equilibrium, the number of good projects nanced is lower than the optimum, and some bad-type projects are evaluated as good. The authors show that an alternative solution is the formation of nancial intermediaries, that is, coalitions of agents that evaluate projects and invest only in those estimated to be of high value 7 . Boyd et al. show that if the coalition ends up funding some bad-type investments, because of lack of good-types projects, there will be no waste of resources in their evaluation. Thus, the ex-ante information produced by the intermediary coalition alleviates adverse selection problems. contracts to rms, other authors show that the same reasoning could be applied to other types of nancial intermediaries that sell the information they produce. In Bhattacharya and Peiderer (1985) , the nancial intermediary is run by a portfolio manager who has greater ability than savers to obtain and understand signals about risky assets. The manager, however, does not invest on behalf of the saver, but his role is only to transmit (by selling) the information to his principal. A more articulated version of the same idea is put forward by Allen (1990) , who characterizes the conditions under which information is merely sold to savers 7 See also 2011) for models where nancial intermediaries help produce information. and the conditions under which the buyers of information act as intermediaries and resell information.
In Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) nancial intermediaries arise endogenously to facilitate trades. Intermediaries increase the expected rate of return on investments through a research-type process during which they produce information on the most protable uses of funds. As in Townsend (1978) , the authors assume that organizational structures are costly, thus the institutional setting of nancial intermediaries is designed to minimize the costs of collecting and processing information. By allowing the migration of funds to investments with high return, the development of the nancial infrastructure promotes economic growth 8 .
Ex-post production of information
The activities just described are linked to the role of nancial intermediaries as information producers at a pre-contractual (ex-ante) stage. However, another crucial role of nancial intermediaries is the monitoring of investment projects that they carry out at the post-contractual stage. In Diamond (1984) , since monitoring is costly, it is ecient to delegate it to a specialized agent, namely a bank. According to the author, borrowers have to be monitored so as to prevent moral hazard ex post. In fact, since lenders do not have sucient information on the output of investment projects, lending contracts cannot be contingent on output. However, if a lender gathers information on production, the information asymmetry can be overcome. In a similar way, Blackburn and Hung (1998) focus on moral hazard in lending contracts: rms have the incentive to claim that their projects have failed in order to avoid repaying their loans to lenders. The authors show that a solution to this problem is represented by incentive-compatible loan contracts, which are enforced through a process of costly monitoring. However, as this process entails xed costs, the development of an advanced nancial sector reduces the unit cost of the monitoring process, thus increasing the rate of growth of the economy.
It thus emerges that nancial intermediaries have a critical role in producing ex-ante and ex-post information. However, despite representing a (partial) solution to information asymmetry problems, this function does not necessarily achieve the most ecient outcome. In fact, there could be an inecient duplication of information production costs if multiple agents end up producing the same information 9 . The most ecient solution would be that a small number of agents produce enough information and then sell it to uninformed agents. Clearly, this solution can lead to a further problem of reliability of the information produced ( who monitors the monitor? ). Hirshleifer (1971) stresses that it may be impossible for an information producer 8 Similarly, Bencivenga and Smith (1993) develop a model in which all investment projects are nanced through credit and examine the consequences of informational frictions on economic growth. Due to adverse selection in credit markets, in turn resulting from the diculty of distinguishing between high-and low-quality investments, lenders engage in credit rationing, depressing growth. 9 A mechanism through which nancial institutions such as banks can share information and avoid duplication of information production are credit registers and bureaus (see, e.g., Doblas-Madrid and Minetti (2013) , for empirical evidence).
to credibly ensure that he has produced valuable information. Leland and Pyle (1977) show that nancial intermediaries can overcome this reliability problem by investing their wealth in the assets about which they produce information. The authors develop a model to analyse conicts of interest between managers and creditors, based on the assumption that entrepreneurs know the true characteristics and the performance of the investment project for which they require nancing, while lenders do not have access to such information.
Due to this conict, the cost of monitoring activities by creditors would be very high and the interest rate applied on loans would be higher than the optimal. The authors show that nancial markets can overcome this problem by inducing entrepreneurs of good quality to retain a large fraction of own capital in companies to signal their quality (see also Campbell and Kracaw (1980) for a similar result).
Khan (2001) develops a dynamic general equilibrium model to study whether nancial development reduces the costs of information asymmetries and thus results in higher economic growth. The starting assumption is that it is costly for lenders to verify production and to discern risky projects. In this situation nancial intermediaries arise that reduce the costly verication of production when borrowers are unable to repay loans. The nancial sector not only lets the most advanced producers benet from higher returns due to lower information costs, but also it creates incentives for other producers to undertake the technological changes needed to access investment loans, which in turn reduces nancing costs and promotes growth.
The importance of relationship lending
Relationship lending deserves special attention when investigating the role of nancial intermediaries as information producers. A more developed nancial intermediary sector can to produce better information through long and tight lending relationship. Boot (2000) stresses two core elements upon which relationship lending is based: i) the engagement of lenders in multiple types of interactions with borrowers; and ii) the repetition over time of such interactions, which reduces the cost of obtaining proprietary information on borrowers. Bhattacharya and Thakor (1993) show that, through customer relations, banks are able to acquire private information on rms to overcome situations of asymmetric distribution of information that prevents rms' access to nancial markets. In addition, Boot and Thakor (2000) show that the establishment of these types of relations involves lasting benets for businesses in terms of a greater amount of credit oered and/or better access to credit, as reected in the interest rate charged and the guarantees required.
In this perspective, the key variable appears to be the length of credit relationships. Boot and Thakor (1994) , for instance, show that the possibility of carrying out repeated transactions is an ecient method to amortize the costs of screening activities. These gains, however, could potentially hide some negative eects, as demonstrated by Sharpe (1990) . In fact, the previous models are based upon the exclusivity of the bank-customer relationship: this exposes the debtor to the risk of being informationally captured by the lender, which can exploit an informational monopoly power and impose higher interest rates ex post. This detrimental eect is also present in Boot and Thakor (2000) who illustrate how the lock-in eect can distort both banks' and rms' incentives, resulting in sub-optimal allocation of capital and/or worse growth decisions of entrepreneurs.
Empirical studies conrm the arguments of the models just discussed, although with some surprising twists. Berlin and Mester (1999) use a data set of 600.000 small business loans over 12 years and do not nd strong evidence in support of a particular role of relationship lending. Their nding contrasts, however, with those of other empirical studies. Petersen and Rajan (1995) show that credit-constrained rms (in their analysis, small enterprises) are more likely to be nanced when creditors can better internalize the benets of assisting rms, i.e. when lending relationships are stable (thanks also to a more concentrated credit market). Elsas and Krahnen (1998) show that relationship lenders are able to provide liquidity insurance to troubled rms in situations of unexpected deterioration of borrower ratings. Moreover, D'Auria, Foglia and Reedtz (1999) nd evidence of lower borrowing costs for Italian rms that have well established bank relationships. Does relationship lending stimulate growth? Weinstein and Yafeh (1998) and Miarka (2000) analyze a large sample of small and large Japanese enterprises in the periods 1977-1986 and 1985-1998 and nd that, although close ties to a bank improve rms' access to capital, this relationship is not necessarily accompanied by higher growth rates. Gambini and Zazzaro (2013) nd that that growth rate of Italian small enterprises is negatively aected by the maintenance of long-lasting ties with a bank, while the growth performance of other rms increases with the length of the relationship.
Improving the management of risk
According to the literature, market-based nancial systems are especially good at ameliorating the management of risk in nancial relations. Levine (2005) argues that, while bank-based systems can provide low-cost services to deal with standard risk management, market-based systems can increase the exibility of these services, oering more products and tools for managing capital. This function is essential, as improvements in the management of risk can positively aect the rate of growth of the economy. Levine (2005) identies three types of risk that could be better managed by a developed nancial sector: cross-sectional risk, liquidity risk, and intertemporal risk.
Cross-sectional risk A more developed nancial system is able to eciently combine and manage both high-and low-risk projects.
This permits to achieve risk diversication, which is crucial for channelling savings to investments with high return and high risk. Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997) develop a model in which minimum investment requirements imply that agents cannot always insure themselves against the risk involved in investing in highreturn projects. They show that, by letting agents hold a diversied portfolio of investments, the nancial sector is the only institution able to reallocate funds from agents who prefer safe returns (namely, current account holders) to risky projects with high returns and high level of initial capital. Clearly, without such a diversication, high-return/high-risk projects would not be nanced, with a consequent negative eect on economic growth.
This ability of nancial institutions to induce a portfolio shift towards projects with higher expected returns was also stressed by Gurley and Shaw (1955) who argued that the primary function of the nancial sector in promoting growth is the transformation of funds from large groups of dierent agents into diversied debt for investors. Obstfeld (1994) develops an endogenous growth model in which greater diversication reduces savings if relative risk aversion exceeds one (with negative eects on the level of investment), but this eect is outweighed by a portfolio shift towards risky assets, so that overall economic growth increases. A counterargument, however, comes from Devereux and Smith (1994) who show that the welfare of a country may be lower with a developed nancial system that allows risk sharing opportunities. The authors nd that growth rates are lower in an equilibrium with full diversication, as this reduces the equilibrium saving rate, depressing growth. Therefore, the welfare gains from risk sharing have to be compared with the losses from a reduced growth rate: the authors assess that, for reasonable parameter values, the losses can dominate and welfare can be lower.
Liquidity risk
Turning to liquidity risk, a major contribution to the analysis is oered by Levine and Zervos (1998) . These authors show that the initial level of stock market liquidity is positively and signicantly correlated with economic growth in a sample of 42 countries over the period [1976] [1977] [1978] [1979] [1980] [1981] [1982] [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] . For instance, a one-standarddeviation increase in the initial stock market liquidity is estimated to increase the per capita GDP growth by 0.8% per year and by 15 percentage points over the 18 years span. These empirical ndings are consistent with the predictions of the theoretical literature. Bencivenga and Smith (1991) show that, by mitigating liquidity risk, the nancial sector can boost investments in high-returns and illiquid investments, thus accelerating growth. Indeed, thanks to liquid capital markets, savers can nance projects with high productivity and at the same time they can hold liquid assets (equity, bonds, etc.) that can be quickly and easily sold if they need access to their savings. In this framework, banks face a predictable demand for liquidity resulting from the law of large numbers and can, therefore, allocate funds more eciently than single individuals.
Building on Diamond and Dybvig (1983) , Levine (1991) constructs an endogenous growth model in which a stock market emerges that allocates risk in the economy ( Figure 7 shows the stock market capitalization in dierent regions of the world; Figure 8 shows the value of stocks traded in the same areas). Levine shows that the stock market alters the steady state growth rate by allowing agents to diversify their portfolios in case of liquidity shocks. A more developed nancial system, in fact, mitigates liquidity risk by letting entrepreneurs hit by liquidity shocks sell their shares to other investors. This way, capital is not prematurely liquidated to satisfy short-run liquidity needs and the accumulation of capital in the economy speeds up, resulting in greater economic growth. This function, however, is not exclusive of stock markets : Diamond (1991) shows that when there are large barriers to the development of a system of equity trading, the banking sector naturally takes a liquidity-enhancing role in the economy, replicating the same equilibrium allocation of capital that arises with liquid equity markets. Intertemporal risk
The last type of risk to be considered is intertemporal risk. Greenwood and Smith (1997) underline that the provision of liquidity by nancial markets limits the exposure of savers to idiosyncratic risk and prevents the costly premature liquidation of long-term investments. Allen and Gale (1997) develop an overlapping generations model in which more developed nancial intermediaries allow to channel a higher fraction of savings to long-run investment projects. These oer returns that are relatively low in booms and relatively high in recessions and thus favour diversication of risk across generations, eliminating the ineciencies due to lack of inter-temporal smoothing. This result also suggests that the nancial sector can have a remarkable eect on the development of innovative activities that have high growth potential in the long run. We address this point in the next section.
3.4 Easing innovation processes Schumpeter (1961) showed that nancial institutions are important for economic activity because they evaluate and nance entrepreneurs engaging in research and development (R&D). The role of nancial institutions in solving information problems and managing risk have been discussed above. What we have not yet examined, however, is how these functions could promote innovation.
A complex theoretical relationship
Innovation is a trial-and-error process, in which it may be initially necessary to nance numerous unexpected opportunities, about which little is known ex ante, but that could have high future returns (Dosi, 1990 ).
Therefore, due to the uncertainty associated with R&D activities, a more developed nancial system can be essential to ensure the necessary screening mechanism, thus promoting innovation and growth. Xu and Huang (1999) argue that, since the uncertainty associated with R&D projects can only be solved when a project is carried out, ex-post selection is more eective than ex-ante selection. The authors show that, when nancial institutions are suciently developed and multi-banking nancing arrangements are set up (in which projects are co-nanced by dierent actors), it is possible to develop a screening mechanism that discards bad projects, even in cases in which the renancing of such projects could be protable ex post.
This prediction is consistent with the cited works of Rajan and Zingales (1998) , as the industries that require most external nancing are primarily those more innovative, and of Wurgler (2000) , as the most innovative industries are also those likely to grow faster.
However, the improvement in the information about R&D projects is just one perspective of the analysis.
Examining the role of risk, Petersen and Rajan (1995) reach opposite conclusions. Building a model in which concentrated banking sectors allow for intertemporal risk sharing, they show that only a concentrated banking sector (i.e., one in which entrepreneurial projects are nanced by only one bank) is able to guarantee low cost of funding in the early stages of rm development. Moreover, Carpenter, Lazonick and O'Sullivan (2003) nd that investments are rarely nanced externally in innovative sectors such as the optical network industry. King and Levine (1993) stress the role of nancial intermediaries both as evaluators of potential innovators and providers of insurance for innovators. Thanks to the cross-sectional diversication obtained by intermediaries, the economy is able to promote investments in growth-enhancing innovative activities that feature high level of risk and thus are not naturally nanced by risk-averse agents. Morales (2003) , instead, applies a dierent approach based on the growth model of Aghion and Howitt (1998) , and considers capital accumulation and R&D activities as complementary sources of growth. He builds a model in which the nancial sector aects the nancing of R&D activities. He demonstrates that nancial activity does have an important role in reducing the incidence of moral hazard in research, increasing the level of monitoring and the probability of success of research projects. However, this impact of the nancial sector on research productivity causes two opposite eects on growth. On the one hand, nancial development fosters research projects with positive spillovers on other sectors of the economy, resulting in higher productivity in the whole economy. On the other hand, the increased R&D productivity raises the probability that an incumbent producer is replaced by an innovator, thus reducing the incentives to accumulate capital. Block (2002) takes a critical approach towards all the above views. He stresses that often rms do not raise funds to allocate them to specic innovative projects, but the majority of funds are given to companies that only subsequently allocate the resources to particular innovative investments. For this reason, one cannot neglect that a key role in the link between nancial development and innovation is played by the organizational and decisions processes within rms. Mayer (1996) develops a model of ownership structure in which economies with more concentrated stakeholders encourage long-term commitment and this allows to allocate internal resources towards R&D projects. Considering a sample of 14 OECD countries, Carlin and Mayer (2003) show that there is no relation between concentration of ownership and R&D, which suggests that ownership concentration provides the commitment needed to encourage basic investment but not more advanced training of skills. Using microeconomic data on a large sample of Italian manufacturers, Minetti, Murro and Paiella (2011) nd instead that an increase in ownership concentration tends to reduce rms' innovation eorts, especially at the R&D stage.
Assessing the pros and cons of market-based and bank-based nancial systems in promoting innovation, Stiglitz (1985) underscores that a very liquid market-based system could lead to an equilibrium in which investors have no incentive to undertake pioneering projects, as the information about innovations could quickly spread to competitors. By contrast, bank-based systems could create more stable relationships and convince entrepreneurs to invest in innovation. Boot, Greenbaum and Thakor (1993) show that the reputation in securing the information provided by innovators could be higher in the case of a bank-based system, thus increasing the resources devoted to R&D projects. However, Carlin and Mayer (2003) contend that, being characterized by more dispersed ownership, market-based systems can be associated with R&D projects of higher risk, while bank-based systems, where ownership is more concentrated, are oriented towards longerterm investments with a more imitative nature.
Empirical ndings
The literature that tests the role of nancial markets in the innovation process is recent, but already rich. A rst concern in dening a successful empirical strategy is to rule out the possibility that the causality goes from innovation to nancial development. In fact, a possible explanation of the existence of a relationship between these two variables is that only those economies with good innovation prospects develop nancial markets that are able to provide the funds necessary to support innovation.
The second concern is linked to the fact that it is not necessarily demonstrated that nancing constraints should matter for R&D activity. As argued by Himmelberg and Petersen (1994) , R&D investment seems to be often nanced by internally generated cash ow in advanced economies. The standard approach for testing this prediction is examining the cash ow sensitivity of investment: despite its large application in many studies, this approach has not delivered a denitive answer. Providing a comprehensive summary of the literature on this issue, Hall and Lerner (2009) conclude that this still remains an open question.
However, analysing a large sample of European rms, Brown, Fazzari and Petersen (2009) show that nancing constraints aect the R&D activity of rms.
A third issue is whether the evidence suggests that market-based nancial systems are preferable or not to bank-based systems for promoting innovation. Some empirical evidence that R&D-intensive rms make relatively little use of debt nance is provided by Aghion et al. (2005) who, using data on publicly traded U.K.
rms, nd that businesses with positive but low R&D use more debt nance than businesses that report no R&D, but the use of debt nance falls with R&D intensity among rms that report R&D. Yet, other studies show that bank-based nancial systems can have a key role in supporting innovation. As demonstrated by Benfratello, Schiantarelli and Sembenelli (2008) in the analysis of over 6,000 Italian enterprises during the 1990s, a higher capillarity of the banking sector (measured as the density of the network of bank branches in Italian provinces) is capable of generating signicant eects on the innovative processes of rms, increasing the likelihood of introducing a process (product) innovation by about 6% (4.5%) in case the density goes from 30 to 50 branches per 100 inhabitants. This positive eect of banking development is also reected in the amount of resources that companies devote to R&D. Studying more than 4,000 Italian businesses in the early 2000s, Herrera and Minetti (2007) show that the length of the credit relationships between banks and rms also increases the probability of innovation. The authors point out that this eect is particularly signicant in the decision of a company to introduce product innovations (rather than process ones). A subsequent analysis of Minetti (2011) demonstrates that banks are particularly eective at fostering incremental innovations, i.e.
innovations that do not drastically change the production processes of rms. He argues that this result is perhaps linked to banks' limited knowledge of radically new technologies.
Finally, two recent empirical studies conrm the innovation-nancial development nexus. Using a large data set including 34 developed and emerging countries and using the patenting rate as a proxy of the innovation activity of a country, Hsu et al. (2011) show that, while the development of equity markets encourages innovation, credit market development impedes innovation. This is particularly true in emerging countries, and in countries with low quality of the legal system and with weak creditor protection. In the same vein, Ayyagari, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2012) analyze over 19,000 rms across 47 developing economies and nd that a rm's access to nance is an important determinant of the extent of innovation it undertakes. Moreover, nancing from foreign banks appears to be associated with higher levels of innovation compared to nancing from domestic banks.
Conclusions
This paper has reviewed the link between the development of the nancial structure and economic growth.
For reasons of space we have not touched on some important areas of research. One such area is the role played by inequality in the relationship between nance and growth. Diculties in accessing nancial markets can not only have adverse consequences on average income levels but also increase income, wealth, and human capital inequality. In a pioneering work, Benabou (1966) posed the question of why two countries that start from a similar macroeconomic situation, such as Philippines and South Korea in the post-war period, have divergent development trajectories. He conjectured that the Philippines were penalized by a more unequal distribution of wealth and an underdeveloped nancial system. The idea is that when nancial markets are inecient, the returns across investment projects are not equalized. The greater the level of inequality, the larger the return dierentials, and the bigger the loss in potential aggregate output. In addition, because in developing countries there is a good degree of learning-by-doing in production, and because production stimulates the assimilation of foreign technologies, the static loss of GDP translates into slower long-run growth.
Financial constraints can also have detrimental eects on investments in education. Households with limited access to nance invest relatively less in human capital than they would do in a world with educational credit. This mechanism was rst examined by Galor and Zeira (1993) where education is an indivisible investment, but generates greater private and social returns than physical capital (which, however, can be increased by small amounts). Lack of credit would induce low-income households to overinvest in physical capital. As a result income inequality increases from one generation to the next, and the economy's growth rate, which depends on the rate of accumulation of human capital, is smaller than it would be in a world with perfect credit markets. It is a fact, however, that the government takes an active role in nancing education directly and indirectly. Arguably, this is the reason the Gini coecients for education are lower than those for income and wealth (Thomas et al., 2001) . Several advanced economies have witnessed an increase in income and wealth inequality in the last two decades or so. In addition, some of these economies have also experienced growth rates lower than their historical trend. The current debate on the reforms of the nancial sector following the Great Recession will necessarily have to take into account the complex linkages among nance, growth and inequality.
